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Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal urban congestion toll in a second-best set-
ting where only one road in a network can be tolled. Both heterogeneity
in labor productivity and income distribution concerns are considered. The
optimal toll balances two types of considerations. The first consideration is
the correction of the congestion externality on the tolled road given the dis-
tortion on the non-tolled roads, while the second is the equity consideration
that takes into account which income group uses the tolled road and how toll
revenues are spent. Both separating and pooling equilibriums are analyzed
for two alternative uses of toll revenues: poll transfers and labor-tax cuts.
Using numerical simulations, we show that equity concerns can lead a gov-
ernment to prefer inefficient toll levels and recycling via poll transfers rather
than via labor tax reductions.
Keywords: Tax reform, congestion pricing, urban tolls
1. Introduction
Transport economists advocate road pricing as an efficient instrument to
regulate the use of road infrastructures. Imposing a road toll that reflects
marginal external congestion costs makes consumers use the road up to the
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point where marginal social costs equalize marginal social benefits. Optimal
road pricing therefore ensures that the only trips made are those that bring
the highest benefits to society. This is only true, however, as long as tolling is
analyzed in a first-best framework. Additional conditions, e.g. not being able
to toll all roads in a network, pre-existing distortions on the labor market,
or equity concerns complicate the optimal design of urban congestion tolls.
The related literature is mainly focused on the interaction of road taxes
with taxes on labor income (see: Mayeres and Proost, 1997; Parry and Oates,
2000; Parry and Bento, 2001; Van Dender, 2003; Parry and Small, 2005;
De Borger, 2009). The issue can be summarized as follows. Road taxes
have a positive welfare impact by reducing congestion externalities. At the
same time, however, they have a negative impact since an increase in com-
muting costs discourages labor supply. Which effect (externality reduction
or reduced labor supply) prevails has become a central question in transport
economics. Parry and Bento (2001) showed that the welfare impact of a road
tax differs according to the use of the tax revenues. Using road tax revenues
to reduce taxes on labor increases social welfare because reduced congestion
and reduced labor taxes compensate workers for the congestion toll. Other
revenue uses, such as poll transfers, do not compensate the negative labor
supply impact and reduce welfare. On the other hand, Mayeres and Proost
(1997, 2001) demonstrated that as long as equity objectives are relevant, ob-
taining significant welfare gains from recycling tax revenues requires a careful
balance of several options. They show that imposing a tax on congestion ex-
ternalities may need a reconfiguration of all taxes, and that a reduction of
labor taxes is not necessarily the best option1.
This paper contributes to this line of research by analyzing the importance
of revenue allocation when heterogeneous drivers use a congested network.
We wonder whether taking into account differences across road users and
redistribution objectives for transport policy can change the welfare effect
implied by the recycling scheme.
Our approach is close to that of Parry and Bento (2001) but we add two
dimensions to their model. First, instead of a choice between a congested road
and uncongested public transit, we model two congested transport options.
1Proost and Van Regemorter (1995) apply this idea to a macro-economic disequilibrium
framework.
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They can be both roads or one of them can be public transit. Allowing
congestion on the untolled alternative is particularly interesting because it
implies that the toll not only brings efficiency gains in the transport market
but also efficiency losses in the form of increased congestion in the rest of
the network (see e.g. Rouwendal and Verhoef, 2004). Second, Parry and
Bento consider homogeneous consumers without paying attention to income
distribution issues. However, we know that at the origin of labor taxes there
is often the income distribution objective. With this in mind, we model labor-
force heterogeneity in the form of differences in labor productivity between
two types (low- and high-income) of workers. Differences in productivity
imply differences in values of time. This in turn determines the sorting of
commuters over the tolled and the untolled route (see e.g. Small and Yan,
2001; de Palma and Lindsey, 2004). Tolling the faster route will tend to
attract the most productive commuters. Therefore, the tax can be imposed
on high-income consumers and can be used either to redistribute resources
to low-income consumers or to obtain additional efficiency gains by lowering
labor taxes for all commuters.
Our analysis shows that the optimal toll differs from the Pigouvian tax.
The toll can be lower or higher than the marginal external cost on the tolled
road. The magnitude of the deviation depends on several aspects: the equity
concerns, who uses the tolled road, who benefits from redistribution and how
easily consumers switch to other alternatives. A numerical exercise provides
two significant insights. First, when accounting for heterogeneity, tolling off
those that are least able to pay for the toll can be welfare improving, on the
condition that the revenue recycling scheme benefits them. Consequently,
if income distribution concerns seek to favor the least productive workers,
the policymaker would prefer to recycle toll revenues through poll transfers.
Second, assumptions about the relationship between the tolling policy and
congestion in the rest of the network determine the effects of the recycling
scheme on labor supply. Neglecting congestion on alternative routes may
result in an overestimation of benefits from the tolling policy.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop an analytical
model and analyze the problem with homogeneous households. In Section
3, we introduce heterogeneity in labor productivity and define four differ-
ent equilibriums of road use. In Section 4, we analyze the social planner’s
problem and derive the optimal tolling rules for the different equilibriums
and for two ways of recycling the toll revenues: poll transfers and labor tax
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cuts. In section 5, we present a numerical illustration. In the last section we
conclude.
2. The household’s problem: road choice
We start with a simple model—in the spirit of Parry and Bento (2001)—
of a representative household whose utility function depends on aggregate
consumption of market goods (X, whose price is normalized to one), leisure
time (tL), and the disutility of commuting
2 (Ψ(·)). The household owns a car
and uses it to commute to work by either one of the two parallel congested
roads (routes U and T ) that connect residential areas to workplaces. Total
number of worked days in a period (D) is the sum of the number of days the
household commutes by road U and by road T (DU and DT ).
U(X, tL, DU , DT ) = U(X, tL) + Ψ(DU , DT ). (1)
A congestion toll (τ) related to distance (d) is applied on one of the two
roads (route T ), while the other (route U) remains untolled. Households
choose which route to use to commute to work, U or T . Thus, the budget
constraint is:
X + gdUDU + (g + τ)dTDT ≤ εw(1− τw)(DU +DT ) +G. (2)
The right-hand side of (2) corresponds to total household’s income com-
posed of work income and a head subsidy (G). Work income in a period is the
product of the daily net wage and the number of days worked in the period,
where ε is labor productivity per day, w is the gross daily wage and τw is
a tax levied on wage income. We assume that households are homogeneous
in all respects except that they exhibit different exogenous levels of labor
productivity. Thus, for the same level of labor supplied, high-productivity
households get a higher income than low-productivity households.
The left-hand side of (2) corresponds to household expenditures on aggre-
gate consumption and commuting. Each day of work requires a commuting
round trip that involves time and monetary costs. When commuting by the
2The separability of the utility function implies that the amount of labor supplied is
independent of the road choice.
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untolled road, only fuel costs are relevant3. g represents fuel price per kilo-
meter, g = cg(1 + τg), where cg is the resource fuel cost (which takes into
account vehicle fuel efficiency) and τg the fuel tax. Commuting by the tolled
road implies paying for the fuel consumption plus the toll. However, this road
allows faster trips, while the untolled road requires more time and higher fuel
consumption due to a longer distance: dU = βdT with β > 1.
Households also face a time constraint:
t¯ = DU +DT + tUdUDU + tTdTDT + tL. (3)
The household’s time endowment during a period (t¯) equates the sum of
labor supplied, commuting time and leisure time. tU and tT are two different
functions of time per unit of distance (e.g. the inverse of the speed -h/km).
Households choose how many days to work in a period (hours of work per day
are fixed4), and how to commute to work. By choosing the optimal number
of workdays (DT and DU) in a period, households indirectly set total income
and total leisure time during the period.
The first-order conditions of maximizing utility (1) subject to (2) and (3)
are (see Appendix B for detailed derivations):
εw(1− τw)− UtL
UX
= gdU + tUdU
UtL
UX
− ΨDU
UX
, (4)
εw(1− τw)− UtL
UX
= (g + τ)dT + tTdT
UtL
UX
− ΨDT
UX
. (5)
These expressions equate the private benefit from an extra day of work
(daily net wage minus the value of daily leisure time foregone by working)
with the generalized private cost of commuting (monetary and time costs).
The monetary cost of transport consists of the fuel consumption charge in
3We consider that costs such as maintenance, insurance, vehicle ownership taxes, etc.,
are constant, since they do not vary with the level of congestion.
4This is a typical assumption in the related literature (see e.g. Parry and Bento, 2001;
Van Dender, 2003). However, it can be argued that hours per day can also be chosen.
By using a labor supply model that allows for optimal choice of both daily work hours
and number of workdays, Gutierrez-i Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) show that
commuting costs can increase daily hours worked. However, they find that the effect on
total labor supply is ambiguous
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the case of commuting by the untolled road (4), whereas it consists of the
fuel consumption plus the toll when commuting by the tolled road (5).
As a result of considering time as a resource, we get the monetary value
of time for each household (UtL/UX). This is the ratio between the Lagrange
multiplier of the time constraint and the Lagrange multiplier of the income
constraint (see Appendix B). The value of spending time in transport5 (Value
of Transport Time, V TT ) is represented in (4) and (5) by the value of time
foregone by commuting plus the marginal disutility of commuting (V TT =
tRdR(UtL/UX)− (ΨDR/UX), where R = U, T ).
Equating (4) and (5) yields the Wardrop equilibrium condition6 in which
the two roads have equal generalized prices7:
τ = g(β − 1) + (βtU − tT )UtL
UX
+
1
dT
(
ΨDT
UX
− ΨDU
UX
)
. (6)
This expression indicates that households are indifferent to taking either
of the two roads when the toll imposed on road T equals the extra-cost of
commuting by road U . That is, the extra-gasoline and the extra travel time
costs plus the difference between the marginal disutility of commuting by
each road8.
A household’s individual decision depends on its own value of time (UtL/
UX), which also determines its willingness to pay for a trip. The opportunity
cost of time indirectly depends on labor productivity. As high-productivity
households normally get higher wages, they should exhibit higher values
of leisure time, whereas low-productivity households exhibit lower values,
i.e. UhtL/U
h
X > U
`
tL
/U `X where h and ` indicate highly- and less-productive
households, respectively. Thus, a sufficiently high toll should make high-
productivity households stay on the tolled road and therefore save high-
valued time. In contrast, as low-productivity households have lower budgets,
5For a detailed explanation of travel time valuation, see Small and Verhoef (2007) and
Jara-Diaz (2000).
6Wardrop principle: “For a given origin-destination pair of substitute roads, all used
routes should have equal average cost and there should be no unused routes with lower
costs” (Small and Verhoef, 2007).
7We assume we can exclude corner solutions where only one of the two roads is used.
8If the marginal disutility of commuting is the same by the two roads ΨDT /UX =
ΨDU /UX , the right hand side of condition (6) is reduced to the extra-gasoline and extra-
time costs: τ = g(β − 1) + (βtU − tT )UtL/UX .
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they should be more sensitive to monetary cost and should prefer taking the
untolled road in order to save money.
We finally define the differentiable demand functions for each road D∗U =
DU(τg, τw, τ, tU , w, ε), D
∗
T = DT (τg, τw, τ, tT , w, ε). Assuming that they exist
allows us to get the household’s indirect utility function υ(τg, τw, τ, tT , tU , w, ε,
G) as a function of exogenous parameters (see Appendix B).
3. Use of the congested roads by heterogeneous households
In the presence of congestion, households take into account their own
travel cost but not the external cost imposed on other users (∂tT/∂DT > 0,
and ∂tU/∂DU > 0). First-best pricing calls for tolling both roads at their
marginal external costs. However, we are interested in analyzing the second-
best configuration where only one of the two roads can be tolled. In this
section we study the user equilibrium. The properties of the user equilibrium
will be instrumental in the derivation of the optimal taxes in the next section.
We assume that the economy is populated by nh highly productive and n`
less productive households (such that nh+n` = N). Both kinds of households
independently choose the number of trips they make in a period DiR (i =
`, h and R = U, T ). As households differ in their willingness to pay for
commuting, differentiating them according to the road used may be useful.
As a start, we assume consumers with higher values of time to take road T
and consumers with lower values of time to take road U9.
Let us assume for a moment that there is no specific preference for a road.
That is, ΨD`T /U
`
X = ΨD`U/U
`
X and ΨDhT /U
h
X = ΨDhU/U
h
X . From the right-hand
side of equations (4) and (5) we can compare the generalized cost (per unit
of distance) of commuting for each road per type of household:
τ + g + tT
(∑
niDiT
) UhtL
UX︸ ︷︷ ︸
chT
≤ β
(
g + tU
(∑
niDiU
) UhtL
UX
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
chU
, (7)
τ + g + tT
(∑
niDiT
) U `tL
UX︸ ︷︷ ︸
c`T
≥ β
(
g + tU
(∑
niDiU
) U `tL
UX
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c`U
. (8)
9As road T attracts those consumers willing to pay more for faster commuting.
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These conditions compare the total generalized cost of commuting by T
(left hand-side) with the cost of commuting by U (right hand-side) for a high-
productivity household (7) and for a low-productivity household (8). When
a household takes the decision to commute by one of the roads, it already
knows the cost of time it will face: total time required multiplied by its own
value of time10. Time required (per unit of distance) by each road is an
increasing function11 of total traffic volume. UhtL/U
h
X and U
`
tL
/U `X represent
the value of time for high- and low-productivity households, respectively.
From (7) and (8) we establish four different equilibriums of use of the
roads by the households12, similar to those established in Small and Yan
(2001). Equations (7) and (8) are developed for each equilibrium in Appendix
C .
3.1. Separating equilibrium
This is the case where high-income households commute only by T (DhU =
0) and low-income households only by U (D`T = 0). This requires equa-
tions (7) and (8) to hold both with inequality (i.e. chT < c
h
U and c
`
T > c
`
U).
3.2. Partially separating equilibrium with the low-income group separated
In this case high-income households commute by T and U , and low-
income households commute only by U (D`T = 0). This requires equation (7)
to hold with equality and (8) with inequality (i.e. chT = c
h
U and c
`
T > c
`
U).
3.3. Partially separating equilibrium with the high-income group separated
In this case high-income households commute by T (DhU = 0), and low-
income households commute by T and U . This requires equation (7) to hold
with inequality and (8) with equality (i.e. chT < c
h
U and c
`
T = c
`
U).
10It implicitly assumes consumers are informed about current traffic congestion condi-
tions on both roads, by for example, electronic bulletin boards or services such as traffic
forecast, and of course, by their own experience.
11tR(
∑
niDiR) in (7) and (8) denotes the time function for each one of the roads.
12If we had used a continuum of household types, as in Verhoef and Small (2004), every
type of household would probably have used only one route.
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3.4. Pooling equilibrium
In this case both kinds of households commute by T and U . If both equa-
tions hold with equality, both types of households will be indifferent towards
taking either of the two roads. This can occur at the no-toll equilibrium13
(τ = 0) and for low toll values. This depends on how large the parameter β
is (the larger β the more difficult it is to obtain a pooling equilibrium) and
on the value of time of low-income commuters (the lower value of time of the
low-income group the more difficult it is to obtain a pooling equilibrium).
4. The social planner’s problem: the optimal toll
The government raises revenues to finance public goods F and a head
subsidy G, using three tax instruments: fuel taxes (τg), tolls (τ) and labor
taxes (τw). We assume equal labor tax rates for both types of households
14.
The government maximizes social welfare15W =
∑
i n
iθiυi(τg, τw, τ, tU , tT , w,
εi, G), subject to the following budget constraint:
wτw
∑
i
∑
R
niεiDiR + τgcg
∑
i
∑
R
nidRD
i
R + τ
∑
i
nidTD
i
T = F +NG. (9)
Each household chooses the optimal number of commuting trips (DiR)
that maximizes its individual utility. The budget constraint (9) varies as a
function of the use of the roads by the households. Thus, each equilibrium
implies a different budget constraint. In what follows, we analyze the optimal
toll level for the four possible equilibriums studied in the previous section.
For each case, toll revenues are returned to the individuals either through
poll transfers or through labor-tax cuts.
13As Small and Yan (2001) and de Palma and Lindsey (2004) show, this is a typical
result of no-toll equilibrium
14This assumption is relaxed in the numerical illustration.
15This is a purely utilitarian social welfare function where increases or decreases in
individual utilities translate into identical changes in social utility. Assumptions on the
concavity of the utility function allow for the differentiation of the social marginal value
of one unit of income over individuals. Aversion to income inequality is introduced via θ,
the social weight given by the government to each kind of household (with
∑
i θ
i = 1).
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4.1. Separating equilibrium
In this equilibrium high-income households take only road T and low-
income households take only road U . Although this case might not seem
realistic, it is useful as a benchmark that allows comparison with the more
complex cases. The government’s budget constraint (9) becomes:
wτw(n
hεhDhT+n
`ε`D`U)+τgcgdT (n
hDhT+βn
`D`U)+τdTn
hDhT = F+NG. (10)
By assumption in the separating equilibrium, the h-group continues to
use only the tolled road but reduces the number of trips made on this road
as the toll increases. On the other hand, the `-group keeps the number of
trips on U fixed.
4.1.1. Toll revenues used to finance head transfers
We derive the optimal congestion tax (τpt, where pt stands for poll trans-
fers) that maximizes social welfare when revenues are returned to households
as poll transfers.
τpt =
1
1− φptϑξ
∂tT
∂DhT
UhtL
UhX
DhT︸ ︷︷ ︸
mecc
− 1− φptϑ
1− φptϑξ ( τgcg + τw
wεh
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
other taxes per trip
), (11)
where φpt =
n`
N
, ϑ =
(
1− U`X
UhX
θ`
θh
)
and ξ = 1 + 1
τ
Dh
T
, with τ
DhT
the elastic-
ity of demand of high-income households for the tolled road (see Appendix
D.1.1).
The optimal congestion toll has two main components, the marginal ex-
ternal congestion cost (mecc) and a correction for the other taxes levied per
trip16. The mecc measures the increase in time cost to all road users caused
by an extra trip per period. In equation (11), it is represented by the prod-
uct of: the increase in commute time from an additional trip (∂tT/∂D
h
T ),
the value of time of the commuter (UhtL/U
h
X), and the number of trips made
per period DhT . Other taxes per trip appear in (11) as the complementary
relationship between work-related trips and the labor market ensures that all
16Given the fully separating assumption, this optimal toll does not incorporate the
typical second-best term that corrects for the distortion of leaving one of the roads untolled.
This will however appear in the partially separating equilibriums.
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taxes (per kilometer) levied per day of work serve to tackle the externality
caused by each day of work, namely congestion. Thus, for example, if the
sum of the fuel and the labor tax exceeds the mecc, rather than taxing road T
commuters, the government should subsidize them. Equation (11) therefore
suggests an optimal combination of the toll, the fuel tax and the labor tax,
rather than a unique optimal toll level.
Each term in (11) is multiplied by a factor that depends on the gov-
ernment distribution concerns (ϑ). The governmental distribution concerns
depend on the ratio of the marginal utility of income of both types of con-
sumers (U `X/U
h
X), and the relative social weight given to a unit of utility
of a poor individual with respect to a rich individual (θ`/θh). Normally,
U `X/U
h
X > 1 as the marginal utility of income declines with the level of in-
come. Similarly, θ`/θh > 1 when the decision maker attaches a higher weight
to less-productive consumers.
If there was no difference between the groups (U `X = U
h
X) and the gov-
ernment attached the same weight to both of them (θ` = θh), the toll should
equal the difference between the mecc and the sum of the other taxes17.
When this is not the case, however, the revenue raising effect implied by the
price elasticity of the tolled road (τ
DhT
) plays an important role. If the weight
attached by the government to the poor is higher and the demand for the
tolled road is inelastic (elastic), the toll should be higher (lower) than the
difference between the mecc and the sum of the other taxes.
This suggests that a greater concern for the welfare of the poor leads to
the use of the toll as an instrument to redistribute income when the demand
for the tolled road is inelastic (in this equilibrium road T is used only by the
rich). However, when demand is elastic the use of the toll as an instrument
to redistribute income is limited, as every euro of additional toll revenues
then has a high efficiency cost.
4.1.2. Toll revenues used to cut labor taxes
Following the same procedure, we obtain the optimal toll (τlt, where lt
stands for labor tax cuts) when the incremental toll revenues are used to cut
17Therefore (11) contains Parry and Bento’s (2001) result (τ = mecc) as a special case:
homogeneous consumers, no redistribution concerns and no other taxes levied per trip.
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labor tax rates:
τlt =
1
1− φltϑξ
∂tT
∂DhT
UhtL
UhX
DhT −
1− φltϑ
1− φltϑξ (τgcg + τw
wεh
dT
), (12)
where φlt =
n`ε`D`U
nhεhDhT+n
`ε`D`U
(see Appendix D.1.2). This expression differs
from (11) in that φlt takes into account the proportion of labor supplied by
low-productivity households. Redistributing income through the labor tax
implies that what drives equity aspects of the toll level is the proportion of
labor supplied by low-productivity consumers (φlt) rather than their propor-
tion in the economy (φpt). It is the proportion φlt that will determine the
extent to which the poor will benefit from a labor tax cut.
4.2. Partially separating equilibrium with the low-income group separated
In this equilibrium high-income households take road T and road U , and
low-income households take only road U . As the roads are substitutes, we
assume that if the toll increases, high-income consumers reduce the number
of trips they make by road T and increase the number of trips they make
by road U . To keep things simple we assume that low-income users do not
change their number of trips by road U as the toll increases18. Thus, the
government’s budget constraint becomes:
wτw(n
hεh(DhT +D
h
U) + n
`ε`D`U) + τgcgdT (n
h(DhT + βD
h
U) + βn
`D`U)
+ τdTn
hDhT = F +NG.
(13)
4.2.1. Toll revenues used to finance head transfers
When the incremental toll revenues are used to finance lump-sum trans-
fers we get (see Appendix D.2.1):
τpt =
1
1− φptϑξ
UhtL
UhX
(
∂tT
∂DhT
DhT +
∂tU
∂DhU
DhUβD
h
TU
)
− 1− φptϑ
1− φptϑξ
(
τgcg(1 + βD
h
TU) + τw
wεh
dT
(1 +DhTU)
)
.
(14)
Because in this case high-income commuters have the possibility to ex-
change trips on road T for trips on road U as the toll increases, we get the
18This assumption is relaxed in the numerical illustration.
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term DhTU = ∂D
h
U/∂D
h
T < 0, which gives the number of trips added to U
per trip removed from T 19. Although equation (14) has the same structure
as (11), it incorporates the marginal external congestion cost caused on road
U by the fraction of trips moved from T to U . This is a typical second best
result: mitigate the distortion on one market only to the extent that it does
not aggravate the distortion on the other market (Small and Verhoef, 2007,
p. 140). As before, (14) implies that the optimal toll should be set as a
fraction of the difference between the mecc and other taxes per trip.
4.2.2. Toll revenues used to cut labor taxes
The optimal toll when the incremental toll revenues are used to cut labor
taxes is given by (see Appendix D.2.2):
τlt =
1
1− φltϑξ
UhtL
UhX
(
∂tT
∂DhT
DhT +
∂tU
∂DhU
DhUβD
h
TU
)
− 1− φltϑ
1− φltϑξ
(
τgcg(1 + βD
h
TU) + τw
wεh
dT
(1 +DhTU)
)
,
(15)
with φlt =
n`ε`D`U
nhεh(DhT+D
h
U )+n
`ε`D`U
. This equation has the same structure
as (14) and contains the externality-correction term. Again, the only differ-
ence between (14) and (15) is φlt, which takes into account the proportion of
labor supplied by low-productivity households as in (12).
Equations (14) and (15) imply therefore a toll level lower than that im-
plied by (11) and (12), respectively, as the former includes a mecc reduced
by the effect of traffic diversion.
4.3. Partially separating equilibrium with the high-income group separated
In this equilibrium high-income households take road T , and low-income
households take both roads. As before, we assume that if the toll increases,
low-productivity consumers reduce the number of trips they make by road
T and increase the number of trips they make by road U . In addition, we
assume that high-productivity consumers reduce their number of trips by
19This trade-off between roads (∂DhU/∂D
h
T ) affects the mecc and the second part of (14)
since revenues collected from other taxes also depend on the road used.
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road T only as a result of the toll increase. However, they do not move to
road U20. The government’s budget constraint becomes:
wτw(n
hεhDhT + n
`ε`(D`T +D
`
U)) + τgcgdT (n
hDhT + n
`(D`T + βD
`
U))
+ τdT (n
hDhT + n
`D`T ) = F +NG.
(16)
The optimal toll, if revenues are used to make poll transfers, is as follows:
τpt =
1
1− φptϑ− ζ
[
EτDhT
UhtL
UhX
∂tT
∂DhT
DhT
+
θ`
θh
EτD`T
U `tL
UhX
(
∂tT
∂D`T
D`T +
∂tU
∂D`U
D`UβD
`
TU
)]
− 1− φptϑ
1− φptϑ− ζ
[
τgcg
(
EτDhT
+ EτD`T
(1 + βD`TU)
)
+ τw
w
dT
(
EτDhT
εh + EτD`T
ε`(1 +D`TU)
)]
,
(17)
where ζ =
∑
i n
iDiT+ϑ`D
`
T∑
i n
iDiT 
τ
Di
T
and Eτ
DiT
=
niDiT 
τ
Di
T∑
i n
iDiT 
τ
Di
T
(see Appendix D.3).
Although (17) is more complex than previous equations, we can identify
the same structure. The optimal toll should be set as a fraction of the
difference between the externality-correction term and the level of other taxes
per trip. The externality-correction term here consists of three terms: the
mecc imposed on road T by both kinds of households and the mecc imposed
on road U by low-income households.
In this case, the value of time and price elasticity of demand of both types
of consumers appears in the equation as they both take the tolled road. Each
term in this expression is weighted by a factor (Eτ
DiT
) that depends on the
price elasticity of each type of household, as the response of consumers to toll
increases depends on their price elasticity. As indicated by Small and Verhoef
(2007, p. 145), when tolls cannot be differentiated among user groups, the
second-best toll depends on a weighted average (by the price sensitivity of
demand) of the marginal external costs for the different groups.
We limit this section to the case of poll-transfer recycling as labor-tax
recycling does not add additional insights compared to the previous section.
20This assumption is relaxed in the numerical illustration.
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4.4. Pooling equilibrium
We mention this case for the sake of completeness, yet it is highly un-
likely that this will be a welfare maximizing equilibrium given that a pooling
equilibrium exists for zero or small tolls only. It is developed in Appendix
D.4.
4.5. The optimal tolling rule: summary
When only one road can be tolled we know this allows for efficiency gains
as high-value-of-time commuters prefer the tolled road. When a separating
equilibrium exists, toll revenues can be used to reduce existing labor taxes
(maximizing efficiency gains) or to decrease poll taxes (maximizing equity
effects). Equity concerns can push the toll above the marginal external con-
gestion cost as this allows to redistribute more revenues to the poor part of
the population. When there is only a partial separating equilibrium the rule
becomes more complex as one now also has to pay attention to the diversion
of drivers to the non-tolled congested route. This calls for lower tolls and
limits the redistribution potential of the toll.
5. Numerical illustration
This section presents the results of a numerical simulation21 of a road
network such as described in Section 2. Although this exercise is merely for
illustrative purposes, we calibrate the model with French data in order to
be coherent and give a realistic flavor to the illustration. Data for the labor
and transport markets are taken from the National Institute of Statistics
and Economics Studies -INSEE (Fesseau et al. (2009) and Baccani et al.
(2007), respectively). Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present the parameter values used
to calibrate the model and the simulation results for the base case. Next,
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 examine the effect of changes in some key parameters.
5.1. Calibration
We choose an urban area of 500.000 inhabitants22 where the average dis-
tance of a daily (round) commuting trip is 50 Km. The slope of the congestion
function is such that the free-flow speed (60 Km/h) is reduced to one-third
21The algorithm was written in GAMS.
22With a labor force participation of 70% and an unemployment rate of 15%.
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in peak hours (this implies a highly congested commuting traffic). Travel
time increases linearly with traffic volume. Both roads exhibit the same con-
gestion functions, but the secondary network (i.e. the untolled road) is 1.5
times longer than the tolled road.
We define a household’s utility function23 separable in two terms, the
utility of consumption/leisure and the disutility of traveling:
U(X, tL, DU , DT ) = (αXX σ−1σ + (1− αX)t
σ−1
σ
L )
σ
σ−1 + αC(DU +DT ). (1
′)
We choose σ = 1.52 to be consistent with values of consumption/leisure
elasticity of the related literature24. αX is chosen to imply (on average)
around 200 days of work per year. We set αC = −1 and give no particular
weight to any of the roads, so that the marginal disutility of traveling for any
of the routes is the same25.
There are two groups of workers that differ only in their labor productiv-
ity. The labor productivity of high-productivity households is around four
times that of low-productivity households26. There is a higher proportion of
low-productivity workers in the economy (65%). We assume wage tax rates
of 22% and 30% for low- and high-productive households27, respectively, and
8 hours of work per day. The gasoline tax is 235% of producer prices (E.C.,
2009, p. 11) and the vehicle fuel efficiency is 10 litres per 100 Km28.
The constraints of this maximization problem are those described in (2)
and (3). Thus, each household chooses, with perfect knowledge of the travel
conditions on the network (tR(
∑
niDiR)), the route and the number of com-
23Similar functions are used in Parry and Bento (2001) and Van Dender (2003).
24See Parry and Bento (2001) p.658 for a discussion of empirical evidence of this pa-
rameter.
25This implies that the roads are perfect substitutes from the consumer perspective.
This reflects the consumer taste and has no relation with the characteristics of the roads.
26According to Fesseau et al. (2009) the best-off households have five times as much
disposable income as the most modest. However this is considering total disposable in-
come, without distinguishing between the source of income. When excluding returns on
financial investments and property income, so that labor income is better accounted for,
the difference in productivity decreases.
27This corresponds to the average rate of social contributions in Fesseau et al. (2009).
28This might seem high compared to current European standards of fuel efficiency, but
we deal with congested urban traffic.
16
muting trips. When a toll is imposed, toll extra-revenues are recycled in one
of two ways: poll transfers and labor tax reductions.
5.2. Base-case results
We first concentrate on changes in the transport market. When there is
no toll (the no-toll equilibrium–NTE ), 69% of total traffic is concentrated on
road T . This makes T highly congested. The average speed of a trip on this
road is around 20 Km/h, whereas on U it is 31 Km/h. Figure 1 depicts the
number of trips that the representative household of each type makes in a
period, as a function of the toll (e/V-Km), in the case of labor-tax cuts29.
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Figure 1: Trips per household in the base case (labor-tax recycling)
The two types of workers react differently to the toll. At the NTE low-
and high-income consumers commute mainly by road T . Although this road
is highly congested, it is shorter and allows less fuel-consuming trips. When
the toll is imposed, low-income consumers reduce the number of trips on T
and go to U . But high-income consumers react differently: they exchange
trips on U by trips on T . As they can pay for the toll, they can take advantage
of the reduction of congestion on T resulting from low-income commuters
leaving this road30. This is true until the point where the toll approaches
0.25 e/V-Km.
29Results from poll transfers are very similar in terms of road use.
30The VOT for low- and high-income consumers are 3.89 and 18.43 e/h, respectively.
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For low toll values (0 ≤ τ < 0.25) we are in the Pooling Equilibrium
where both kinds of workers commute by both roads. For higher toll values
(τ ≥ 0.25) we are in the Partially Separating Equilibrium with the low-income
group separated. In this case, low-income consumers are priced off road T 31,
given that the cost of commuting by T exceeds the cost of commuting by U .
High-income consumers, on the other hand, start switching to road U since
paying a higher toll level no longer compensates the gain in time.
Given that road T allows faster and less fuel-consuming trips than the
alternative, imposing a toll helps to reduce congestion on this road. At
τ = 0.25 (the level that allows the separating regime under labor-tax cuts),
for instance, the reduction of traffic on T compared with traffic at the NTE
is around 15% (the average speed rises from 20 to 26 Km/h). But this re-
duction comes at the expense of an increase of traffic on U of 35% compared
with the NTE (the average speed falls from 31 to 24 Km/h). As a conse-
quence, the reduction of congestion does not benefit all commuters in the
same way. Given that low-productive workers use only road U at τ = 0.25,
their commuting time (per commuter) at this point increases by 12% whereas
the commuting time for highly-productive workers falls by 14% (compared
with the NTE ).
Now we turn to the effects on the labor market. Reduced congestion
induces a positive feedback effect, that mitigates the negative impact of the
toll, but this holds only for highly productive workers (left panel Figure 2).
The impact of the toll on the less productive workers is negative. Given the
large losses on the less productive labor market, the impact on aggregate
labor supply (in days, not in product) ends up negative (right panel Figure
2).
This differs from Parry and Bento (2001). Our results suggest that, when
labor-force heterogeneity and congestion on the untolled alternative are ac-
counted for, using toll revenues to reduce distortionary labor taxes does en-
courage labor force participation but only among the most productive work-
ers (those able to pay for the toll). Similar results are found for poll transfers.
This means that, both types of revenue allocation can discourage labor force
participation at the margin. Our results still show, however, that labor sup-
31Specifically, low-income consumers are tolled off road T at τ = 0.23 for poll transfers
and τ = 0.25 for labor-tax cuts.
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Figure 2: Labor supply in the base case: per type of household (left) and aggregate (right)
ply would decline more when toll revenues are used to make poll transfers
instead of labor tax cuts.
Welfare effects of both policies are depicted in Figure 3 (the vertical axis
shows the change in individual welfare, in monetary terms, compared with
welfare at the NTE ). There is a clear difference between the two scenarios of
revenue use across the income groups. Low-income consumers benefit in the
case of head transfers. Recycling via labor-tax cuts is welfare reducing for
them. On the other hand, high-income consumers benefit from both measures
but the welfare gains are (slightly) higher when revenues are redistributed
through labor-tax cuts. This is because, given the same percentage-point
reduction of the labor tax for both groups, the resulting head subsidy is lower
(higher) than the tax rebate that a high-income (low-income) household gets.
Labor-tax cuts benefit the h-households given that, besides the gains from
reduced congestion, they receive the major share of the revenues that are to
be redistributed through this scheme. The `-households, on the other hand,
are not compensated enough for the increase of congestion they experience32.
This means that benefits and costs of recycling through this scheme are to
some extent distributed in an inequitable way.
It is worth noting an additional result from Figure 3. High-income workers
32This could, of course, be different if instead of the same percentage-point reduction of
the labor tax for both groups, the government uses differentiated labor-tax reductions to
attain a Pareto-improving reform.
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Figure 3: Change in utility for both recycling policies per type of household (base case)
get the maximum welfare gain at the point where low-income workers are
tolled off road T (at τ = 0.23 for poll transfers and at τ = 0.25 for labor-tax
cuts). Surprisingly, low-income workers also get the highest benefits when
they are tolled off (of course, only in the case of poll transfers). In fact, in this
case they do not pay for the toll but get the transfers from the high-income
group. This would imply that product differentiation is beneficial, even for
lower income groups, provided the right allocation of toll revenues is used.
This is consistent with Small and Yan (2001) in the sense that, there is
a welfare gain when heterogeneity is accounted for. However, given that we
consider labor markets, revenue allocation and redistribution33, we find that
the efficiency gain and the impact on both types of users depend on the way
toll revenues are spent.
Even if this result contrasts with that of Parry and Bento (2001), it
seems to be in line with Proost and Van Regemorter (1995) who show that
the choice of the recycling scheme depends on preexisting conditions in the
labor market34.
33Small and Yan (2001) do not deal with the use of the toll revenues nor the effects
of redistribution among users. Their focus is instead on the efficiency of the second-best
one-route pricing policy compared with the first-best result.
34Proost and Van Regemorter (1995) use an AGE-model for Belgium to study the effects
of a carbon-energy tax, by comparing the same two kinds of revenue recycling measures,
but analyze a classical unemployment regime with sticky real wages and a well-functioning
economy.
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Figure 4: Welfare gains per household with poll-transfer recycling (left) and total welfare
for both recycling policies (right)
Under the Pareto principle only recycling through poll transfers represents
an improvement over the NTE. When acceptability requires the consent of
both types of households, only this tax reform would be approved. Under this
recycling regime, any toll level in the range from 0.15 to 0.28 would make all
households better off (left panel Figure 4). The choice of the toll level depends
on the government’s distribution concerns. Toll values close to the separating-
regime level (e.g. 0.23) favor the highly productive workers (without making
the `-group worse off), and toll values closer to the higher limit (e.g. 0.28)
favor the less productive workers (without making the h-group worse off).
This implies that a toll level higher than the one that achieves efficiency in the
transport market can be justified in regard to redistribution and acceptability
concerns. Total welfare, obtained by the unweighted aggregation of utilities,
is depicted in the right panel of Figure 4. Welfare effects of labor-tax recycling
are negative whereas poll-transfer recycling can be considered as potential-
Pareto welfare improving in the range from 0.1 to 0.35 e/V-Km35.
5.3. The importance of congestibility of the untolled alternative
We explore here one of the key assumptions of our model: congestion
on the untolled alternative. In this case, this road’s congestion function is
replaced by a constant time-per-unit-of-distance function. This means that,
35Note that the potential-Pareto set (Kaldor-Hicks criterion) contains the strict-Pareto
subset identified in the left panel of Figure 4.
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independent of the travel speed, an extra trip added to this road does not
increase the user’s time cost. We call this a non-congestible alternative. We
calibrate the time function to exhibit the same speed as road T at the NTE 36
(16 Km/h). The rest of the parameters remain unchanged, except for αX
that, as in the base case, is chosen to imply on average 200 days of work per
year at the NTE.
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Figure 5: Trips per household with a non-congestible alternative (labor-tax recycling)
Travel patterns change significantly (Figure 5), not because the fixed-time
cost of U , but rather because both roads exhibit a high time cost at the NTE.
At this point, consumers only use road T . As the toll increases high-income
households increase the use of this road and the low-income ones switch to
road U .
Not surprisingly, the negative impact on labor supply is reduced now that
road U can accommodate the traffic removed from T without any congestion
effect (Figure 6). When toll revenues are recycled through labor-tax cuts,
the net impact on aggregate labor supply is positive (right panel Figure 6),
as in Parry and Bento (2001). This means that neglecting congestion on the
untolled alternative may result in an overestimation of the labor-supply gains
from labor-tax recycling. On the other hand, if toll revenues are recycled via
36Think of this as a road with infinite capacity but whose travel speed is somehow
limited to a given level. We take road T speed as a reference in order to be coherent with
the previous section.
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Figure 6: Labor supply with a non-congestible alternative: per type of household (left)
and aggregate (right)
poll transfers, the effects on aggregate labor supply are still negative given
the labor supply reduction by the less skilled.
Welfare effects of both policies are similar to those in Figure 3. Recycling
through labor-tax cuts remains welfare reducing for the low-income group
and welfare improving for the high-income group. A separating equilibrium
is beneficial for both groups. The main difference with the base-case result
is that eliminating congestion on the alternative road increases the poten-
tial welfare gains from each regime.The labor-tax recycling scheme becomes
(potential-Pareto) welfare improving for a large range of toll levels (right
panel Figure 7). These results are clearly driven by the assumptions on
the substitute for the tolled road. As highlighted by Basso and Silva (2014),
congestion pricing can be welfare improving for low-income groups if the sub-
stitute of the tolled infrastructure–in their case public transport–is optimized
to accommodate the demand that is tolled off.
5.4. The relative size of the income groups
We briefly consider the sensitivity of results to the relative size of the
income groups. Our results show that the composition of the economy plays
an important role in the efficiency and welfare effects of the tolling policy.
We vary the size of the groups to imply a share for the low-income group
of 5 to 95%. We find that the higher the proportion of low-income households
in the economy, the higher the reduction of congestion on road T . Clearly,
the more commuters that are willing to leave the tolled road whenever a toll
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Figure 7: Change in utility for both recycling policies with a non-congestible alternative:
per type of household (left) and total (right)
is imposed, the more traffic can be removed from T . The reduction of travel
time ranges from around 4%, when the share of the `-households is 5%, to
around 48%, when the share of the `-households is 95%. A higher share of
the low-income group benefits therefore the high-income group in terms of
congestion reduction.
Interestingly, the pattern of households that benefit from the tolling policy
changes with the variation of these shares (Table 1). The tolling policy is
beneficial for high-income commuters whenever the share of the `-group is
higher than 45%, regardless of the recycling scheme. This is because the
group with the lowest value of time should represent more than a certain
proportion of the population to obtain a significant reduction of congestion
from a tolling policy. On the other hand, the `-group benefits only when
its share is lower than 75% and toll revenues are recycled via poll transfers.
Basically, if the majority of households are low-income, toll revenues (paid
by those who keep using T ) are not enough to compensate this group for
being diverted from T .
Only one Pareto-improving policy was found (Table 1). This policy re-
quires two conditions. First, toll revenues should be recycled via poll transfers
(the recycling scheme that does not harm the `-group). Second, the share
for the `-group should be in the range between 45% and 75%37. This en-
37These ranges are for the set of parameters of the base case. Of course, changes of
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Table 1: Pattern of households that benefit from the tolling policy
Policy Share of the `-group Who gains
Poll transfers ` < 45% Only `-group gains
Poll transfers 45% ≤ ` ≤ 75% Both groups gain
Poll transfers ` > 75% Only h-group gains
Labor-tax cuts ` < 45% No gain
Labor-tax cuts ` ≥ 45% Only h-group gains
sures that the reduction of congestion is attractive enough for the h-group
(` ≥ 45%) and that the head transfer is enough to compensate the `-group
for being diverted from T (` ≤ 75%).
The variation of the group shares also affects labor supply. This is directly
related to the efficiency of the instrument in terms of reducing congestion.
The higher the share of the low-income group, the more the high-income
group will increase its labor supply and benefit from the pricing of one of the
roads.
6. Conclusion
This paper considered the introduction of road pricing in an economy
with low and high productivity workers and where only one of two congested
links can be tolled. Revenues can be recycled via poll transfers or labor-
tax cuts. We show that the introduction of a toll recycled via lower labor
taxes may benefit only the more productive workers. The main reason is
that the less productive workers, who are tolled off the fast route, end up on
the more congested untolled route and are insufficiently compensated by the
labor tax reduction. For this reason recycling via a head subsidy may make
road pricing more acceptable. Of course, whenever the untolled route is not
subject to congestion, road pricing becomes a much more efficient instrument
and it is much more likely that labor tax recycling becomes an acceptable
instrument.
Our results are relevant for all situations where the transport network
some of those parameters could shift the limits of the ranges, but that should not change
the main insight.
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cannot be tolled completely and where there are large differences in worker
productivity. In many developing and developed countries these two con-
ditions are present. The untolled alternative can be back roads or public
transport. Some countries (e.g. France) even require the presence of an un-
tolled alternative for every road that is tolled. We show that this is not a
guarantee for a Pareto-improvement.
This paper can be extended in several ways. One can consider more
complex networks, consider explicitly two modes rather than two links, in-
troduce other local externalities along the two roads, consider leisure trips in
addition, etc. However, this is unlikely to change our main insights.
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Appendix A. Notation
Symbol Meaning
R = U, T Index type of road: U untolled road and T tolled road
i = `, h Index type of household: ` low-income and h high-income
N Total number of households
ni Number of households i-type
Xi Consumption of market goods
tiL Leisure time
DiR Number of commuting days
G Head transfer
F Public goods
U i(Xi, tiL) Utility of consumption-leisure
Ψi(DiR) Disutility of commuting
tR(n
i, DiR) Time per unit of distance
τg Fuel tax
τ iw Labor tax
τ Toll per unit of distance
g Fuel price
cg Resource fuel cost
dR Distance
β Distance difference between the roads (β = dU/dT )
εi Labor productivity per day
ω Gross daily wage
t¯ Household’s time endowment in a period
ciR Generalized cost of a trip
θi Social weight
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Appendix B. The household’s problem
The household’s problem defined by (1), (2) and (3) can be solved by maximizing the
following Lagrangian function:
L = U(X, tL) + Ψ(DU , DT )− λc [X + gdUDU + (g + τ)dTDT
−εw(1− τw)(DU +DT )−G] + µc [t¯−DU (1 + tUβdT )−DT (1 + tT dT )− tL] ,
where the Lagrangian multiplier related to the income constraint (λc) is the marginal
utility of income, and the Lagrangian multiplier related to the time constraint (µc) is the
resource value of time. For X > 0, DU > 0, DT > 0 and tL > 0, the system of first-order
conditions can be written as:
∂L
∂X
= UX − λc = 0 ⇒ λc = UX
∂L
∂tL
= UtL − µc = 0 ⇒ µc = UtL
∂L
∂DU
= ΨDU − λc [gβdT − εw(1− τw)]− µc(1 + tUβdT ) = 0
∂L
∂DT
= ΨDT − λc [(g + τ)dT − εw(1− τw)]− µc(1 + tT dT ) = 0
(B.1)
Using these conditions and both budget constraints, we obtain the demand functions for
X∗, D∗U , D
∗
T , and t
∗
L. Replacing these functions in the utility gives the indirect utility
function υ(τg, τw, τ, tT , tU , w, ε,G) which enables rewriting the household’s problem as:
L = υ(τg, τw, τ, tT , tU , w, ε,G) + λc [X + gdUDU + (g + τ)dTDT
−εw(1− τw)(DU +DT )−G]− µc [t¯−DU (1 + tUβdT )−DT (1 + tT dT )− tL] .
F.O.C.:
∂L
∂τ
= υτ + λcdTDT = 0 ⇒υτ = −UXdTDT
∂L
∂τg
= υτg + λccgdT (βDU +DT ) = 0 ⇒υτg = −UXcgdT (βDU +DT )
∂L
∂τw
= υτw + λcεw(DU +DT ) = 0 ⇒υτw = −UXεw(DU +DT )
∂L
∂tU
= υtU + µcdUDU = 0 ⇒υtU = −UtLdUDU
∂L
∂tT
= υtT + µcdTDT = 0 ⇒υtT = −UtLdTDT
∂L
∂G
= υG − λc = 0 ⇒υG = UX
(B.2)
Note that the marginal disutility of the toll increase (υτ ) is the marginal utility of income
(UX) multiplied by the optimal number of trips (DT ). Similarly, the marginal disutility of
an increase of travel time on road T (υtT ) is the the resource value of time (UtL) multiplied
by the optimal number of trips.
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Appendix C. User equilibrium conditions
Separating equilibrium
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT
) UhtL
UhX
< βg + βtU
(
n`D`U
) UhtL
UhX
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT
) U`tL
U`X
> βg + βtU
(
n`D`U
) U`tL
U`X
Partially separating equilibrium with the `-group separated
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT
) UhtL
UhX
= βg + βtU
(
nhDhU + n
`D`U
) UhtL
UhX
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT
) U`tL
U`X
> βg + βtU
(
nhDhU + n
`D`U
) U`tL
U`X
Partially separating equilibrium with the h-group separated
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT + n
`D`T
) UhtL
UhX
< βg + βtU
(
n`D`U
) UhtL
UhX
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT + n
`D`T
) U`tL
U`X
= βg + βtU
(
n`D`U
) U`tL
U`X
Pooling equilibrium
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT + n
`D`T
) UhtL
UhX
= βg + βtU
(
nhDhU + n
`D`U
) UhtL
UhX
τ + g + tT
(
nhDhT + n
`D`T
) U`tL
U`X
= βg + βtU
(
nhDhU + n
`D`U
) U`tL
U`X
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Appendix D. The social’s planner problem
Appendix D.1. Separated equilibrium
By assumption, in this case, DhU = 0 and D
`
T = 0.
Appendix D.1.1. Poll transfers
Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to τ , when dτ affects dG, gives:
dW
dτ
= θhnh
(
υhτ + υ
h
tT
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ υhG
dG
dτ
)
+ θ`n`υ`G
dG
dτ
(D.1)
with ∂tT /∂D
h
T > 0, dD
h
T /dτ < 0, and dG/dτ > 0. Replacing B.2 into D.1 gives:
dW
dτ
= −θhnhdTDhT
(
UhX + U
h
tL
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
)
+
(
θhnhUhX + θ
`n`U `X
) dG
dτ
(D.2)
Differentiating (10) with respect to τ gives the change in the transfer (dG) associated to
a change in the toll (dτ):
dG
dτ
=
nhdT
N
[(
τ + τgcg + τw
wεh
dT
)
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
]
(D.3)
Inserting D.3 into D.2 and dividing by UhX , we have:
dW/dτ
UhX
=
(
θhnh
N
+
θ`n`
N
U `X
UhX
)(
τ + τgcg + τw
wεh
dT
)
dDhT
dτ
+
(
θhnh
N
+
θ`n`
N
U `X
UhX
− θh
)
DhT − θh
UhtL
UhX
DhT
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
(D.4)
Setting dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and defining the elasticity of demand of high-income consumers for
the tolled road as τ
DhT
=
dDhT
dτ
τ
DhT
, we get (11).
Appendix D.1.2. Labor-tax cuts
The welfare impact when incremental toll revenues are used to cut the labor-tax is:
dW
dτ
= θhnh
(
υhτ + υ
h
tT
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ υhτw
dτw
dτ
)
+ θ`n`υ`τw
dτw
dτ
(D.5)
with dτwdτ < 0. Replacing B.2 into D.5 we have:
dW
dτ
=− θhnhdTDhT
(
UhX + U
h
tL
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
)
− (θhnhεhDhTUhX + θ`n`ε`D`UU `X)wdτwdτ
(D.6)
Differentiating (10) with respect to τ and solving for w dτwdτ gives:
w
dτw
dτ
=
−nhdT
nhεhDhT + n
`ε`D`U
[(
τ + τgcg + τw
wεh
dT
)
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
]
(D.7)
Inserting D.7 into D.6, dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using τ
DhT
we get (12).
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Appendix D.2. Partially separated equilibrium with the `-group separated
Here by assumption D`T = 0.
Appendix D.2.1. Poll transfers
dW
dτ
= θhnh
(
υhτ + υ
h
tT
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ υhtU
∂tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhU
dτ
+ υhG
dG
dτ
)
+ θ`n`υ`G
dG
dτ
(D.8)
with
∂DhU
∂DhT
< 0. Replacing B.2 into D.8 gives:
dW
dτ
= −θhnh
(
UhXdTD
h
T + U
h
tLdTD
h
T
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ UhtLβdTD
h
U
∂tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
−UhX
dG
dτ
)
+ θ`n`U `G
dG
dτ
(D.9)
Differentiating (13) with respect to τ and solving for dGdτ gives:
dG
dτ
=
nhdT
N
[(
τ + τgcg
(
1 + β
∂DhU
∂DhT
)
+ τw
wεh
dT
(
1 +
∂DhU
∂DhT
))
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
]
(D.10)
Inserting D.10 into D.9, dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using τ
DhT
we get (14).
Appendix D.2.2. Labor-tax cuts
dW
dτ
= θhnh
(
υhτ + υ
h
tT
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ υhtU
∂tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhU
dτ
+ υhτw
dτw
dτ
)
+ θ`n`υ`τw
dτw
dτ
(D.11)
Replacing B.2 into D.11 gives:
dW
dτ
= −θhnh
(
UhXdTD
h
T + U
h
tLdTD
h
T
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ UhtLβdTD
h
U
∂tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
−UhXεhW (DhT +DhU )
dτw
dτ
)
− θ`n`U `Xwε`D`U
dτw
dτ
(D.12)
Differentiating (13) with respect to τ and solving for W dτwdτ gives:
w
dτw
dτ
= − n
hdT
nhεh(DhT +D
h
U ) + n
`ε`D`U
[(
τ + τgcg
(
1 + β
∂DhU
∂DhT
)
+τw
wεh
dT
(
1 +
∂DhU
∂DhT
))
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
] (D.13)
Inserting D.13 into D.12, dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using τ
DhT
we get (15).
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Appendix D.3. Partially separated equilibrium with the h-group separated and
revenues recycled via poll transfers
Here by assumption DhU = 0.
dW
dτ
= θhnh
(
υhτ + υ
h
tT
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ υhG
dG
dτ
)
+ θ`n`
(
υ`τ + υ
`
tT
∂tT
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
+υ`tU
∂tU
∂D`U
∂D`U
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
+ υ`G
dG
dτ
) (D.14)
Replacing B.2 into D.14 gives:
dW
dτ
=− (θhnhUhXDhT + θ`n`U `XD`T )dT −
(
θhnhUhtLD
h
T
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ θ`n`U `tLD
`
T
∂tT
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
)
dT
− θ`n`U `tLβdTD`U
∂tU
∂D`U
∂D`U
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
+
(
θhnhUhX + θ
`n`U `X
) dG
dτ
(D.15)
Differentiating (16) with respect to τ and solving for dGdτ gives:
dG
dτ
=
dT
N
[
τ
(
nh
dDhT
dτ
+ n`
dD`T
dτ
)
+ τgcg
(
nh
dDhT
dτ
+ n`
(
1 + β
∂D`U
∂D`T
)
dD`T
dτ
)
+τw
w
dT
(
nhεh
dDhT
dτ
+ nhεh
(
1 +
∂D`U
∂D`T
)
dD`T
dτ
)
+ nhDhT + n
`D`T
] (D.16)
Inserting D.16 into D.15, dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using τ
DiT
we get (17).
Appendix D.4. Pooling equilibrium and revenues recycled via poll transfers
In this equilibrium both kinds of households take both roads. Assume that if the toll
increases, both groups reduce the number of trips they make by road T and increase the
number of trips they make by road U . Also assume that road users reduce the number
of trips on T only as a result of the toll increase. These assumptions were relaxed in the
numerical illustration. The government’s budget constraint is:
wτw(n
hεh(DhT +D
h
U ) + n
`ε`(D`T +D
`
U )) + τgcgdT (n
h(DhT + βD
h
U )
+ n`(D`T + βD
`
U )) + τdT (n
hDhT + n
`D`T ) = F +NG.
(D.17)
Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to τ , when dτ affects dG, gives:
dW
dτ
= θhnh
(
υhτ + υ
h
tT
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ υhtU
∂tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ υhG
dG
dτ
)
+ θ`n`
(
υ`τ + υ
`
tT
∂tT
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
+ υ`tU
∂tU
∂D`U
∂D`U
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
+ υ`G
dG
dτ
) (D.18)
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Replacing B.2 into D.18 gives:
dW
dτ
= −(θhnhUhXDhT + θ`n`U `XD`T )dT −
(
θhnhUhtLD
h
T
∂tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ θ`n`U `tLD
`
T
∂tT
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
)
dT
−
(
θhnhUhtLD
h
U
∂tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+ θ`n`U `tLD
`
U
∂tU
∂D`U
∂D`U
∂D`T
dD`T
dτ
)
βdT +
(
θhnhUhX + θ
`n`U `X
) dG
dτ
(D.19)
Differentiating (D.17) with respect to τ and solving for dGdτ gives:
dG
dτ
=
dT
N
[
τ
(
nh
dDhT
dτ
+ n`
dD`T
dτ
)
+ τgcg
(
nh
(
1 + β
∂DhU
∂DhT
)
dDhT
dτ
+ n`
(
1 + β
∂D`U
∂D`T
)
dD`T
dτ
)
+τw
w
dT
(
nhεh
(
1 +
∂DhU
∂DhT
)
dDhT
dτ
+ nhεh
(
1 +
∂D`U
∂D`T
)
dD`T
dτ
)
+ nhDhT + n
`D`T
]
(D.20)
Inserting D.20 into D.19, dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using τ
DiT
we get:
τpt =
1
1− φptϑ− ζ
[
EτDhT
UhtL
UhX
(
∂tT
∂DhT
DhT +
∂tU
∂DhU
DhUβD
h
TU
)
+
θ`
θh
EτD`T
U `tL
UhX
(
∂tT
∂D`T
D`T +
∂tU
∂D`U
D`UβD
`
TU
)]
− 1− φptϑ
1− φptϑ− ζ
[
τgcg
(
EτDhT
(1 + βDhTU ) + E
τ
D`T
(1 + βD`TU )
)
+ τw
w
dT
(
EτDhT
εh(1 +DhTU ) + E
τ
D`T
ε`(1 +D`TU )
)]
,
(D.21)
This is the more general equation derived in this analysis. Interpretation is as explained
in Section 4.
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